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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to analyze the e¤ect of transitory satura-
tion on the frequency of new product introductions. We focus on those
product categories in which a specic product is purchased only once but
repeat purchases are made in the same product category: like movies,
books, concerts, computer games, etc. The model considers innitely-
lived, forward-looking consumers and rms. We show that a monopolist
may introduce new product too frequently with respect to both the rst
and the second best. We also show that, provided rms share enough
information about their production plans, competition exacerbates the
tendency towards excessively frequent introduction of new products.
JEL Classication numbers: L12, L13
key words: transitory saturation, repeat purchases, monopoly, compe-
tition
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the performance of markets for non-durable goods in which
consumer preferences are subject to transitory saturation. For many repeat-
purchase, consumption goods, and specially for leisure goods, the utility derived
from a consumption episode tends to increase with the time elapsed since the last
purchase. The paper focuses on how consumers transitory saturation a¤ects
the frequency of new product introductions.
I would like to thank Martin Perry and Roberto Burguet for their useful comments,
and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2008-01850), Barcelona GSE and
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Consider the example of the motion picture industry. Major Hollywood
studios typically spend large amounts in advertising around the release date.
Concentration of advertising e¤orts seems essential to the protability of the
movie since approximately 40% of box o¢ ce revenues are obtained during the
rst week and very few movies generate signicant revenue beyond the sixth
week. Studios choose very carefully the timing of movie releases, trying to
avoid as much as possible any overlapping with other movies that appeal to
similar audiences. It has been reported that studios are constantly rescheduling
their opening dates and that they often pre announce their plans in order to
avoid head-to-head competition.1 However, shifting opening dates probably
involves signicant costs and, hence, independent suppliers are likely to have
a hard time trying to coordinate their release dates, which suggests that the
degree of information sharing is critical. In fact, it is often suggested that
sharing information about movie releases tends to relax competition and reduce
welfare.2
Consumerstransitory saturation is likely to be an important ingredient of
the timing game played in the motion picture industry. Moviegoers need some
time to "recover" from a previous experience before they are ready to see another
movie of a similar type. Nevertheless, the speed of recovery varies a lot across
consumers. Transitory saturation has been ignored in previous analysis, which
in contrast often assumed that demand at a point in time is exogenous. In
this context, the timing of releases matters because studios trade o¤ the high
revenues of the holiday seasons with the intensity of competition (Krieder and
Weinberg, 1998). However, Einav (2009) has shown that box o¢ ce revenues
would increase if distributors did not cluster their releases so much around big
holiday weekends, which clearly indicates that total demand does depend on
the timing of releases.3 In a similar vein, Corts (2001) has shown that market
1For a useful discussion of common practices and stylized facts in the motion picture
industry, see Corts (2001), Krider and Weinberg (1998), and Einav (2007).
2 In 2006 major lm distributors (members of the Spanish Federation of Film Distributors)
were sanctioned by Spanish competition authorities. One of the reasons was that through the
Federation lm distributors exchanged information regarding the planned dates for releases.
3Movie theaters employ uniform prices. See Orbach and Einav (2007) for a discussion of
potential reasons. Hence, changes in revenues are exclusively the result of changes in ticket
sales.
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structure a¤ects the timing of movie releases. When two similar lms are both
jointly produced and jointly distributed then they are released further apart
than in the case they have neither a producer nor a distributor in common.
This suggests that integrated structures internalize negative externalities and
set schedules in order to maximize joint prots. By spreading opening times
more evenly they are able to increase total demand and prots.
Transitory saturation is likely to a¤ect the timing of new product introduc-
tions not only in the motion picture industry, but also in a much broader set
of goods. In particular, it may be important in those product categories in
which a specic good is typically purchased only once but repeat purchases are
made in the same product category. Examples include concerts, books, music
recordings, computer games, etc.
In this paper we present a dynamic (discrete time) model with innitely-
lived consumers and rms in order to analyze the e¤ect of transitory saturation
on the timing of new product introductions. In our stylized model production,
commercialization, and consumption occur simultaneously. Thus, the model
literally describes the market for highly perishable goods, like concerts. Even
though soem goods, like movies and computer games, may be available to the
consumer for long periods of time, strong preference for purchasing the good as
soon as it is available, reinforced by heavy advertising campaigns at the time of
release, render the gap between commercialization and consumption negligible.4
Somewhat paradoxically, we show that monopoly power need not reduce the
frequency of new product introductions below the level that maximizes social
welfare. In fact, if the impact of transitory saturation is su¢ ciently strong then
a monopolist may introduce new products too frequently with respect to both
the rst and the second best. Competition, at least under some conditions,
is shown to exacerbate the tendency towards excessively frequent new product
introductions.
Under transitory saturation consumers are willing to purchase the good only
if the current net surplus (their current valuation minus the price) is higher
than the opportunity cost of waiting (if they abstain from current consumption
4We do not distinguish either between production and commercialization.
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their future valuation of the good will in average be higher). Thus, if new
products are introduced with high frequency, consumers are choosier because
the opportunity cost of waiting is larger. However, the opportunity cost of
waiting decreases with the level of prices. In other words, consumersincentives
to speculate and delay the purchase increase with the frequency of new product
introcutions and decrease with prices. Firms also have incentives to speculate.
In the case new products are introduced relatively often, a monopolist nds it
optimal to charge a price above the level that maximizes current prots. The
reason is that abstaining consumers will have a higher (in average) willingness
to pay for the next product.
When the monopolist introduces a new product then the optimal price leaves
some consumers out of the market and prots are lower than total surplus (the
standard apropriability problem). If the impact of transitory saturation is small
then the appropriability problem implies that the frequency of new product in-
troduction is ine¢ ciently low: the monopolist only captures a fraction of the
surplus but must pay the entire cost. In contrast, if the impact of transitory
saturation is su¢ ciently strong, the monopolist is able to capture a higher pro-
portion of total surplus under high frequency. As a result, a monopolist may
introduce new products more frequently than a utilitarian social planner. In this
case, we get the surprising result that monopoly power may imply both over-
production (new products are introduced too quickly) and underconsumption
(new products are purchased by too few consumers).
It is also shown that in the monopoly case multiple (Markov) equilibria
may exist and that the high frequency may generate lower surplus than the
low frequency equilibrium. The economic intuition is discussed in Section 4,
right after the analysis. Also in Section 5 we discuss under what conditions
competition is likely to exacerbate the tendency towards excessively frequent
new product introductions. It is also argued that information sharing among
independent suppliers and coordination of production plans need not reduce
social welfare.
The role of transitory saturation in repeat purchase, perishable goods is
somewhat analogous to the e¤ect of depreciation or quality improvements in
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durable goods; in the sense that they both induce repeat purchases and generate
a link between current demand and past purchases. Like transitory saturation,
depreciation of durable goods also generates an endogenous pattern of repeat
purchases. However, if there are no quality improvements then the good is
continuously available; i.e., the timing of production is not an issue.5
The analogies between our framework and the study of quality improvements
in durable goods are clearer. In the latter case, the pattern of repeat purchases
is also endogenous. Moreover, the timing of product innovation is also a crucial
variable. There is an extensive literature analyzing product innovation (quality
upgrading) in durable goods. In line with the results of our paper, it has been
shown that a monopoly supplier may introduce more upgrades than socially
optimal (See, for instance, Waldman, 1993; Choi, 1994; Ellison and Fudenberg,
1998). These papers present two-period models and focus on network externali-
ties and compatibility between old and new models. Perhaps, the model closest
to ours is Fishman and Rob (2000), in the sense that they also consider an in-
nite horizon framework and study how e¢ cient is the frequency of innovations
generated under monopoly. A crucial assumption of their model is that innova-
tions are cumulative and show that a monopolist introduces new products too
slowly with respect to the social optimum (at least, in case of no price discrim-
ination and no planned obsolescence). The reason is that current innovation
e¤orts have a positive e¤ect on all subsequent models, but consumers are only
willing to pay for the incremental ow of services the current model provides.
Despite of certain similarities with the case of durable goods, our model
focuses on non-durable goods for which consumer preferences are subject to
transitory saturation. Whether or not the current framework can be adapted
to deal with durable goods is left for future research.
5The literature on depreciating durable goods has focused on very di¤erent issues; for
instance, on the role of replacement sales in preventing the Coase conjecture (Bond and
Samuelson, 1984; Driskill, 1997), or the e¤ect of scrapping subsidies (Adda and Cooper,
2000).
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2 The model
This is a dynamic, innite horizon, model of a market for a homogeneous, per-
ishable good. For convenience, time is a discrete variable, denoted by t; t =
0; 1; 2; ::: The good can be produced in period t at a xed cost, F; and constant
marginal cost, which is normalized to 0: Thus, literally the model describes a
perishable good that it may not be continously available (think, for instance,
of concerts). However, it is straightforward to interpret it also as a model of
new product introductions, in which consumers purchase a specic product only
once but they make repeat purchases of a product category (movies).
The least conventional aspect of the model are consumer preferences, which
are history dependent. In particular, the market is populated by a continuum of
innitely-lived consumers of mass one. In each period a consumer can purchase
at most one unit of the good. Individual consumer preferences are stochastic
and depend on the recent history of purchases. More specically, consumer i0s
instantaneous utility in period t, rit, is a stochastic variable whose density func-
tion depends on the consumption behavior in the previous period. If consumer
i did not consume in period t   1 then rit is a realization of distribution NC,
which is uniform on the interval [0; 1] : In contrast, if consumer i did consume
in period t  1, then rit is a realization of distribution C; such that:
rit =

0, with probability 1  
 U [0; 1] , with probability 
where  is a xed parameter, 0   < 1: Thus, conditional on not having
consumed in period t   1 a consumers expected utility from and additional
consumption episode in period t is equal to 12 : However, if a consumer did con-
sume in the previous period, her expected utility from additional consumption is
equal to 2 <
1
2 : The parameter  measures the extent of transitory saturation,
with  = 0 describing the maximum saturation. Note that, for tractability, the
preference cycle lasts for only two periods.
We denote by t the fraction of consumers that get a positive realization of
rit. Clearly, t will depend on t 1 and on the consumption behavior in period
t   1; in a way that will be specied below. Thus, 0 is one of the exogenous
parameters of the model, but t; for all t > 0; are endogenous variables. We
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restrict ourselves to the particular case of 0 = 1: The reader will soon realize
that this is equivalent to focusing on the medium and long-run performance of
the industry. It turns out that studying the short-fun behavior for an arbitrary
value of 0 2 [0; 1] ; is quite demanding technically (specially when discussing
the e¢ ciency of various market structures) and brings about little additional
insights.
A consumer obtains a net surplus of rit   pt if she chooses to consume in
period t at a price pt: Otherwise she gets 0:Consumers are forward looking and
maximize the expected discount value of their net surplus, using a discount
factor, ; 0   < 1. Firms are also innitely-lived and maximize their expected
discounted value of prots, using the same discount factor, .
3 The rst best
An allocation can be described as a pair (t; It) for each period t = 0; 1; 2; ::;
where  = 1 indicates that production takes place (and the xed cost is paid) and
 = 0 indicates no production (and hence no consumption). The set I  [0; 1]
describes the set of values of ri for which agents consume in case production has
taken place. Thus, if t = 0; then It = ?. In this section we characterize the
allocation that maximizes the expected discounted value of total surplus (prots
plus consumer surplus). We start by characterizing the optimal consumption
pattern conditional on t = 1 for all t. Next, we consider alternative production
paths and their associated consumption patterns.
Suppose production takes place every period. Since marginal costs are con-
stant the optimal choice of each consumer only depends on her own realization,
rit, and not on the aggregate consumption level. If consumer i acquires the good
then her expected level of utility is rit + UCt+1; where U
C
t+1 is the continuation
value at the beginning of period t+ 1, before she gets a draw from distribution
C. If she waits (does not consume) then she gets UNCt+1 , where U
NC
t+1 is the
continuation value at the beginning of period t+1, before she gets a draw from
distribution NC: Note that neither UCt+1 nor U
NC
t+1 depend on rit. Thus, from
an e¢ ciency point of view, consumer i should consume if and only if rit  rt;
where
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rt = 
 
UNCt+1   UCt+1

(1)
In other words, It = [rt; 1] : Thus, an e¢ cient allocation consists of a se-
quence of threshold values, frtg1t=0 ; that maximizes the present value of total
surplus:
W0 =
1X
t=0
ttR (rt) (2)
where R (rt) is the total surplus generated in period t if all consumers with
rit 2 [rt; 1] acquire the good. That is, R (rt) =
R 1
rt
rdr = 12
 
1  r2t

. Note that
t is determined by past consumption behavior. More specically, in period
t  1 the fraction of agents who consumed was (1  rt 1)t 1: A fraction  of
these consumers, plus all those who did not consume, 1   (1  rt 1)t 1; will
be able to draw in period t a positive rit: Therefore, the law of motion of t is:
t = 1  (1  ) (1  rt 1)t 1 (3)
The solution of this optimization problem is characterized in the following
lemma. If we let z = (1  ) then
Lemma 1 If production takes places every period, it is e¢ cient that consumers
purchase the good if and only if rit  r, which is given by:
r =
1 + z  p1 + 2z
z
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Note that r is an increasing function of z and can take values in the inter-
val

0; 2 p3 : Consumershistory-dependent preferences matter to the extent
that they value the future. Thus, the impact of transitory saturation is captured
by this composite parameter z: If either  = 1 (in which case distributions NC
and C coincide) or  = 0; then z = 0 and r = 0; since there is no relevant
intertemporal preference e¤ect. In the other extreme, if consumers do not dis-
count the future ( = 1) and transitory saturation is most intense ( = 0) then
z = 1; and r reaches its highest possible value (2 p3). In general, it is e¢ cient
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to consume if instantaneous utility is su¢ ciently higher than the opportunity
cost of waiting, 
 
UNC   UC, which is constant over time.
Since the optimal rt is constant over time, then the law of motion becomes:
t = 1  (1  ) (1  r)t 1: (4)
Since 0 < (1  ) (1  r) < 1; then t converges to the steady state value
 = 11+(1 )(1 r) ; following an oscillating trajectory.
Let us now turn to the endogenous determination of the frequency of pro-
duction. All possible optimal trajectories can be identied with the number
of production periods, N , that precede a period without production. In other
words, for an arbitrary N , 0 = 1 = ::: = N 1 = 1 and N = 0: As a re-
sult, N+1 = 1 and a new cycle of N consecutive production periods starts. In
particular, one of the possible optimal paths consists of producing every period
(N =1); which can be called option (1), and whose associated payo¤ can be
computed rewriting equation (2) using equation (4):
W1 =
0 +

1 
A
  F
1   =
1
1  

1
A
  F

(5)
where A = 1+z(1 r
)
R(r) : Note that A
 increases with z:
A second possible trajectory consists of producing every other period (N = 1),
starting in period 0;i.e.; t = 1 if and only if t = 0; 2; 4; ::: In this case, in all
subsequent production periods t = 1; independently of current consumption
decisions. Hence, the value of waiting is 0 and consequently it is e¢ cient to let
agents consume provided ri  0: The expected payo¤ of option (1) is:
W 1 = 0R (0)  F + 
2
1  2 (R (0)  F ) =
1  2F
2
 
1  2 (6)
In the Appendix we prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 If F < 12 ; an e¢ cient allocation implies either production takes place
every period (N =1) or every other period (N = 1) :
Thus, the optimal policy can be found by simply comparing equations (5)
and (6). If we let F  = 1
 
1+
A   12

we can state the following result:
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Proposition 3 The rst best allocation consists of: (i) Producing every period
(t = 1 for all t  0) and letting all agents with rit  r consume, if F 2 [0; F ] ;
(ii) Producing every other period (t = 1 if and only if t = 0; 2; 4; :::) and letting
all agents with consume if rit  0, if F 2

F ; 12

:
4 Monopoly
Consider the case in which there is a single supplier. In each period the monop-
olist can choose whether or not to produce, which is indicated by the variable
t 2 f0; 1g :t = 1 means that the rm produces in period t (and pays the xed
cost). In this case it must also announce a price pt: After observing the price
and their own realizations, rit, consumers decide whether or not to consume.
Since all consumers face the same continuation value, then consumersdecisions
can be described by a threshold value, rt, i.e., consumers purchase the good if
and only if rit  rt. We restrict ourselves to Markov strategies; that is, t; pt;
depend exclusively on the state variable, t, and rt depend on t and pt. More-
over, we focus on equilibria where transaction prices are constant over time.
That is, along the equilibrium path pt = p whenever t = 1:
It will be useful to start analyzing the case in which production takes place
every period.
4.1 Preliminaries: production every period
Suppose that the xed cost is su¢ ciently low so that the monopolists nds it
optimal to produce every period, t = 1 for all t: In this case, the strategies of
the rm and consumers can be written as p (t) = pm and r (pt; t) = f (pt) ;
respectively. We will denote by rm the threshold value along the equilibrium
path, i.e., , rm = f(pm): In equilibrium, pm is the price that maximizes the
expected value of prots, under the beliefs that consumers behave according to
r (pt; t) = f (pt) and that (pm; rm) will prevail in the future, and r (pt; t) =
f (pt) describes consumersoptimal behavior under the beliefs that (pm; rm) will
prevail in the future.
Consumer decisions
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If a consumer with rit purchases the good then she gets rit   pt + UC ;
otherwise she gets UNC : Along a constant price equilibrium UNC and UC are
independent of pt and constant over time. Thus, for all t :
rt = f (pt) = pt + 
 
UNC   UC (7)
Note that @rt@pt = 1: Consumers compare the instantaneous utility from con-
sumption, rt   pt; with the option value of waiting, 
 
UNC   UC, and hence
purchase if and only if rit is su¢ ciently higher than pt: In fact, along a constant
price equilibrium we have that:
UNC =
Z 1
r
(r   p) dr + (1  r) UC + rUNC
UC = 
Z 1
r
(r   p) dr +  (1  r) UC + (r + 1  ) UNC
and hence:
UNC   UC = (1  )

1
2
 
1  r2  (1  r) p
1 + z (1  r)
Finally, if we plug the above equation into equation (7) and evaluate it at
rt = r; and pt = p, then we have:
p = r [1 + z (1  r)]  z
2
 
1  r2 (8)
Note that if p = 0 then equation (7) implies that r = r : Unsurprisingly,
what prevents e¢ ciency is the market power that allows the monopolist to
charge a price above marginal cost.
Firms optimal pricing
In period t the monopolists payo¤ is given by:
(t) = argmax
pt
t (1  rt) pt   F + (t+1)
where rt is given by equation (7) ; (t+1) is the continuation value at the
beginning of period t+ 1; and t+1 is given by equation (4) : In particular,
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t+1 = 1  (1  ) (1  rt)t
Note that @t+1@rt = (1  )t; and
@t+1
@t
=   (1  ) (1  r) :
Let us conjecture that () is a linear function of , and in particular that
d(t+1)
dt+1
= k; which is independent of t: Then, the rst order condition of the
rms optimization problem (the second order condition is satised) is:
(1  rt   pt) + kz = 0 (9)
The rst important remark is that the optimal pt does not depend on t;
and therefore a constant price equilibrium may exist. The second remark is that
the intertemporal e¤ect on demand induces the rm to raise its price. In other
words, if the rm increases its price slightly above the level that maximizes
static prots, it causes a second order loss on current prots but it raises future
prots (rst order e¤ect) by increasing demand in the next period.
By the envelop theorem if we evaluate (t) at the constant price equilib-
rium then:
k =
d(t)
dt
= (1  r) p  kz (1  r)
Hence, k is independent of t: Solving for k and plugging into equation (9)
we obtain:
p = (1  r) [1 + z (1  r)] (10)
Equilibrium
Equations (8) and (10) uniquely determine the equilibrium values of (pm; rm) :
rm =
2 + 3z  p4 + 6z
3z
(11)
pm =
2 + 6z  p4 + 6z
9z
(12)
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The red lines in Figure 1 depict the locus describing optimal consumer
choices (equation 8), on the one hand, and optimal monopoly prices (equa-
tion 10), on the other in the case z = 0. Similarly, the blue lines correspond to
the case z = 1: Note that rm is an increasing function of z; with rm (z = 0) = 12 ;
and rm (z = 1) = 5 
p
10
3 :Similarly, p
m is also an increasing function of z, with
pm (z = 0) = 12 and p
m (z = 1) = 8 
p
10
9 : Finally, r
m (z) > r (z) :
For future reference we introduce additional notation:   rm   pm =
4+3z p4+6z
9z :
4.2 The frequency of production under commitment
Let us now study the frequency of production that arises in equilibrium. In this
subsection we consider, as a benchmark, the case where the rm can choose
the entire production path, ftg1t=0, in period 0. Given the production path, in
each period t the rm sets the price, pt; and consumers decide whether or not
to purchase the good:We compute the equilibrium behavior for alternative pro-
duction paths, and then characterize the optimal production paths in di¤erent
regions of the parameter space.
If production takes place every period, N = 1, then equilibrium prices and
consumer behavior are (pm; rm), which are given in equations (11) and (12) :
Hence, the present value of prots is given by:
1 (0) =
0 +

1 
Am
  F
1   =
1
1  

1
Am
  F

(13)
where Am = 1+z(1 r
m)
(1 rm)pm :
As in the previous section, option (1) consists of producing in periods t =
0; 2; 4; :: In this case, both rms and consumersoptimization problems become
static. Consumers anticipate that in the next production period they will draw
their ri from distribution NC independently of their current behavior, and
hence purchase if and only if rit  pt. Similarly, the monopolists anticipates
that demand in the next production period is independent of current prices and
hence p maximizes static prots. As a result rt = pt = 12 (prots per production
period are equal to t 14   F ). In this case the rms payo¤ is given by:
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1 (0) = 0
1
4
  F + 
2
1  2

1
4
  F

=
1
1  2

1
4
  F

(14)
In the Appendix we prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 If F < 14 ; then the monopolists either commits to producing every
period (N =1) or to producing every other period (N = 1).
Therefore, the production trajectories in the equilibrium with commitment
can be characterized by comparing equations (13) and (14) :If we let Fm =
1

 
1+
Am   14

we can state the following result:
Proposition 5 If the rm can commit to production trajectories, the (gener-
ically) unique constant price equilibria consists of: (i) producing every period,
charging a price pm, and selling to consumers with ri  rm, if F 2 [0; Fm] ; and
(ii) producing every other period, charging a price 12 and selling to consumers
with ri  12 , if F 2

Fm; 14

:
In order to asses the e¢ ciency of the frequency of production selected by
a monopolist (under commitment) we simply need to compare F  and Fm:
Suppose  is close to zero. In this case, F  is close to 12 and F
m is close to
1
4 . Therefore, F
 > Fm: In this case, monopoly power tends to slow down
production with respect to the rst best. However, if  = 0, as  goes to 1 then
F  goes to 0:0360 and Fm goes to 0:0502. That is, if  is su¢ ciently close to
1 then F  < Fm. In this case, a monopolist tends to produce too often with
respect to the rst best. Summarizing:
Remark 6 Under commitment a monopolists may choose a frequency of pro-
duction higher or lower than in the rst best. In particular, excessively frequent
production occurs when the impact of transitory saturation is su¢ ciently high.
Monopoly power causes two types of ine¢ ciencies. First, the static price
distortion leads to underconsumption whenever production is available. Sec-
ond, the frequency of production is typically ine¢ cient, although the sign of the
ine¢ ciency is ambiguous. The reason behind this ambiguity can be described
as follows. Suppose the monopolist is able to appropriate a fraction  of total
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surplus under all circumstances. With respect to the rst best, the payo¤ di¤er-
ential associated to alternative frequencies (gross of xed costs) is scaled down
by ; but nevertheless it has to incur the entire xed cost. In this case, the
rms limited ability to appropriate surplus tends to slow down its frequency
of production. However, under transitory saturation the fraction of the surplus
appropriated by the monopolist varies with the frequency of production. If pro-
duction takes place every other period (and r = p = 12 ) then the monopolist
captures one half of the total surplus (gross of xed costs). However, if pro-
duction takes place every period then the monopolist captures more than one
half of the total surplus (gross of xed costs). The reason is that an increase
in the price above marginal costs reduces consumersvalue of waiting (reduces
UNC UC), which reduces the gap, r p. In other words, as consumers become
less defensive the rm can capture a higher fraction of total surplus. Thus, if
the impact of transitory saturation is su¢ ciently strong, the monopolists ability
to appropriate a higher proportion of total surplus under N = 1 may induce
the monopolist to overproduce. In such a case, and somewhat paradoxically,
underconsumption coexists with overproduction. That is, the monopolists may
produce too often, with respect to the e¢ cient allocation, but when it does
produce then it sells to too few consumers.
4.3 The frequency of production in the absence of com-
mitment
In the absence of commitment, the rm chooses every period  and p, and con-
sumers select r: A strategy for the rm is a pair f (t) ; p (t)g ; and consumers
strategy can be written as r (pt; t) : It turns out that, despite of the restrictions
on the strategy space, for most parameter values multiple equilibria exist. In
order to illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria, let us we consider two types of
equilibria.
Equilibrium type I
Let us consider the strategies that support an equilibrium where production
takes place every period (N =1):
If t 2 [; 1] then t (t) = 1; pt (t) = pm; and r (pt; t) = pt +:
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If t 2 [0; ) then t = 0; pt (t) = pm;and r (pt; t) = pt +:
It has been shown above that this reects consumersoptimal behavior when-
ever they expect production in every period. Also, given such consumer behav-
ior, this strategy is optimal for the rm provided it does not have incentives
to deviate at t = 1. The only potentially protable deviation would consists
of setting a price pd such that in the following period t+1 <  (and hence
t+1 = 0): If the rm conjectures that t+1 = 0 then it will set the price that
maximizes current prots, i.e. pd = 1 2 : Therefore, the expected value of
prots obtained from such deviation is given by:
d (1) =
(1 )2
4
  F + 2d (1)
Thus, an equilibrium of type I requires that d (1)  1 (1) ; which is
equivalent to F  F1; where F1 is given by:
F1 =
1

"
1 + 
Am
  (1 )
2
4
#
If  = 1;  = 0; then F1 = 0:0863:
Equilibrium type II
Let us now consider the strategies that support an equilibrium where pro-
duction takes place every other period:
If t = 1, t (t) = 1; pt (t) =
1
2 ; and r (pt; t) = pt:
If t 2 [; 1) then t (t) = 1; pt (t) = pm; and r (pt; t) = pt +:
If t 2 [0; ) then t = 0; pt (t) = pm; and r (pt; t) = pt +
We have shown above that consumersstrategy is the optimal response to
the rms strategy. In equilibrium the rms expected prot is equal to 1 (1) :
The only potentially protable deviation at t = 1 is to select a price pd under
the expectation that in the next period t+1   and hence t+1 = 1: In this
case, pd is chosen in order to maximize:
d (p) = (1  p) p  F + 1 [1  (1  ) (1  p)]
Thus,
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pd =
Am + z
2Am
Finally, an equilibrium of type II requires that the optimal deviation is not
protable: d
 
Am+z
2Am
  1 (1) ; i.e., F  F0; where F0 is given by:
F0 =
1
 (1 + )  1

1  2
4

1 +
z
Am
2
+
 (z + ) (1 + )
Am
  1
4

It must also be the case that for values of  arbitrarily close to 1, the rm
must nd it optimal to set p = pm: Hence, an equilibrium of type II will exist if
and only if an equilibrium of type I also exists, i.e., if F  F1:
If  = 1;  = 0; then F0 = 0:0502: Therefore, if F 2 [0:0502; 0:0863] then
and equilibrium of type I and another equilibrium of type II both exist.
Remark 7 There exists parameter values for which both type I and type II
equilibria exist.
The intuition of the multiplicity of equilibrium is the following. Suppose
t = 1: If both consumers and the rm expect that production will take place in
every period, then consumers nd it optimal to purchase only if their current net
surplus is su¢ ciently high (higher than ), and rms prefer to set a relatively
high price
 
pm > 12

: As a result, sales are relatively low, and hence t+1 is
relatively high. Consequently, the rm nds it optimal to produce in period t+1.
In contrast, if consumers and the rm expect that t+1 = 0; then consumers
purchase even if the current surplus is arbitrarily low, but positive, and the rm
prefers to set a relatively lo price
 
1
2

. As a result, sales are relatively abundant
and t+1 is relatively low. Consequently, the rm prefers not to produce in
period t+ 1.
When both types of equilibrium exist it may be interesting to learn which
equilibrium is preferred. In the case  = 0 and  = 1 the payo¤s per period in
each type of equilibrium are given in the following table.
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Type I equilibrium Type II equilibrium
Prots 0:1501  F 0:125  F2
Consumer surplus 0:0750 0:0625
Total surplus 0:2251  F 0:1875  F2
Thus, in spite of higher prices consumers always prefer the type I equilib-
rium, since the good is continuously available. In contrast, the rm prefers
the type I equilibrium if and only if F  0:0502: Finally, a utilitarian social
planner prefers the type I equilibrium if and only if F  0:0752: Thus, when
both types of equilibrium exist there is a conict of interest. Consumers and
the rm will never agree about which equilibrium they should play. Also, a
utilitarian social planner prefers the equilibrium with high frequency of produc-
tion if F 2 [0:0502; 0:0752] but prefers the equilibrium with low frequency if
F 2 [0:0752; 0:0863]. Thus, the possibility of overproduction under monopoly
arises not only when we compare the equilibrium with respect to the rst best
(which requires price controls), but also there may be overproduction in a dif-
ferent sense. Perhaps, agents play an equilibrium with a high frequency of
production (type I), when there is another equilibrium with a lower frequency
of production that generates higher social surplus.
5 Competition
The model can accommodate more than one rm provided rms are symmetric
(same cost structure) and produce a homogeneous good.
We proceed in two steps. First, we discuss the e¤ect on competition in a
simple version of the model with rectangular demand functions and next we
discuss pricing behavior in the original model.
5.1 Competition without the static price distortion
Consider the following consumer preferences. If agent i did not consume in
period t   1 then rit = 1 with probability 1; but if she did consume in period
t  1 then rit = 1 with probability  and 0 with probability 1  :
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Suppose there are n  2 identical rms (with the cost structure considered
above) that are able to produce a homogeneous good. At the beginning of each
period, rms decide whether or not to produce (and pay the xed cost). After
observing which rms have decided to incur the xed costs, then these rms
simultaneously and independently quote a price. Those consumers that prefer
to consume choose the rm with the lowest price. In case of a tie consumers are
equally split between rms.
Analogously,we denote by t the mass of consumers with rit = 1. Since
in equilibrium all consumers with rit = 1 purchase the good, then the law of
motion is given by:
t = 1  (1  )t 1
If production takes place every period then t converges to 12  :
5.1.1 Symmetric Markov equilibria
If in period t only one rm pays the xed cost, then it quotes a price equal to
one and sales are equal to t. If two or more rms pay the xed costs, then there
is Bertrand competition and prices are driven down to zero. Thus, rms always
prefer not to produce if another rm is producing. Hence, a symmetric Markov
equilibrium involve mixed strategies. In equilibrium each rm is indi¤erent
between producing and not producing. In case of production, a favorable state
is one where the rm is a transitory monopolist. However, if more than one rm
produce the good then revenues are zero and prots are equal to  F . Thus,
from a social point of view, competition may not be desirable for two reasons.
First, with some probability the good may not be available as often as e¢ ciency
requires. Second, the good may be available but xed costs may be paid by
more than one rm at a time.
5.1.2 Coordination of production decisions
In order to avoid duplication of xed costs and head-to-head competition, rms
have incentives to coordinate their production decisions. If they also coordinate
on prices then the market structure is equivalent to a monopoly. Suppose rms
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do not coordinate on prices. We can think of a very simple and symmetric
coordination method. At the beginning of each period one rm is randomly se-
lected, with equal probability and independent of history. Formally, equilibrium
behavior under such coordination mechanism form a correlated equilibrium. The
selected rm can choose whether or not to produce. In case of production, the
rm will be a transitory monopolist and charge a price equal to 1 and sell to t
consumers.6 The selected rm will choose to produce in period t if and only if:
t   F + (t+1)  (1) (15)
where () is the continuation value of any rm at the beginning of the
period before learning the outcome of the lottery. Thus, if production takes
place in period t+ 1, then:
(t+1) =
1
n
(t+1   F ) + (t+2) (16)
We can compute the continuation value of a rm in an equilibrium where
production takes place every period by solving equation (16) recursively:
(t+1) =
   F (1 + z) + (1  )t+1
n (1 + z) (1  ) (17)
Since 0 = 1, 1 = . Hence, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
the existence of an equilibrium with production every period is equation (15),
evaluated at t = , where the continuation values are given by equation (17),
which is equivalent to F  F c where:7
F c = 

1  z
n (1 + z)

If n = 1the rm can appropriate the entire surplus and thus implement the
rst best solution. Production every period is e¢ cient only if at  =  the
current surplus is su¢ ciently high as to compensate for the future value of a
higher consumer base: 1 instead of 1    (1  ) : In this case the threshold
6 In this context it is immediate to show that the unique equilibrium with constant prices
involves p = 1:
7 If F > F c then production takes place every other period and the expected payo¤ for
each rm is 1 F
n(1 2) :
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value is F c = 1+z . As n increases, then each each rm discounts more heavily
the future gains associated with a higher consumer base and as a result has
incentives to produce even when current prots are relatively low ( for relatively
high values of the xed cost). In other words, F c increases n. In fact, if n is
su¢ ciently large, then the rm which is selected to produce in the current period
essentially disregards future prots and is willing to produce provided current
prots are not negative. In other words, F c goes to  as n goes to innity:
Summarizing:
Proposition 8 Under rectangular demand, if rms coordinate their produc-
tion decisions using a symmetric static mechanism, then competition generates
overproduction (the frequency of production is ine¢ ciently high). The range of
parameter values under which there is overproduction expands with the number
of rms.
5.2 Coordination of production with elastic demand (to
be completed)
It is important to understand how the results of the previous subsection change
if we reintroduce the static price distortion. More specically, we would be in-
terested in the characteristics of equilibria in the framework of Section 4 but
allowing for an arbitrary number of rms that coordinate their production deci-
sions using the symmetric, static mechanism described above. In such a mixed
model the results would also be a combination of those in Sections 4.3 and 5.2.
Let us start discussing pricing behavior. Even though rms behave as tran-
sitory monopolists there is intertemporal competition. If n > 1 each rm dis-
counts future prots more heavily than the monopolist and therefore sets lower
prices. In fact, prices decrease with n, and as n goes to innity rms set the
price that maximize current prots.
Competition also changes private incentives to produce. The most impor-
tant change is that under competition rms discount more heavily the e¤ect of
current action future prots and hence they tend to produce more often. In
fact, if n is arbitrarily large then rms produce as long as current prots are
not negative. Also, since intertemporal e¤ects are less important, total surplus
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associated with production every period is higher than in the case of monopoly.
In any case, the frequency of production under competition (and coordination
of production) may be higher or lower than in the rst best. Moreover, more
competition (higher n) may involve lower total surplus (despite of lower prices)
because of the incentives to produce too frequently.
In order to illustrate this discussion let us consider the case that n is arbi-
trarily large. Let us rst consider equilibria where production takes place every
period. In this case, consumer behavior is still given by equation (8) : However,
the behavior of rms is now di¤erent from the monopoly case. A rm which is
called to produce if it chooses to do so then it will set a price that maximizes
current prots [1  r (p)] p, where r (p) = p+: The rm takes  as given (it is
the value of waiting, which is a function of expectations about future behavior)
but in equilibrium  = r   p:
Thus, the prot maximizing price is p = 1 2 :Combined with equation (8) ;
we obtain the equilibrium values of (rc:pc) :
rc =
2 + z  p2 (2 + z)
z
pc =
 2 +p2 (2 + z)
z
Note that pc < 12 < r
c < rm. Since consumers are still forward looking
 > 0: However, rms behave myopically. As a result prices are lower than
1
2 ; which induces higher levels of consumption than under monopoly, although
consumption is still lower than in the case consumers are myopic or they do not
su¤er from transitory saturation.
An equilibrium with production every period will exist if for the lowest pos-
sible value of t along the equilibrium path prots are non-negative. In other
words, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium
with production every period is that: [1  (1  ) (1  rc)] (1  rc) pc   F  0:
In the case  = 1;  = 0 such a condition is F  0:1110:
It turns out that in this parameter range forcing rms to produce every other
period might increase total welfare. If production takes place every period, and
behavior is summarized by (rc:pc) given above, then total surplus per period is
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equal to 0:2090  F: However, if rms are forced to produce every other period
then r = p = 12 ; and total surplus per period is equal to 0:1875  F2 . Therefore,
total surplus is higher under low frequency production if F  0:0430:
6 Discussion
In this paper we have presented an innite horizon model to analyze the e¤ect of
transitory saturation on market performance. If consumersexpected valuation
for the good tends to increase with the time elapsed since the last consumption
episode then consumers purchase the good only if their current valuation is
su¢ ciently higher than the current price. The gap is explained by the option
value of waiting (the consumers expected future valuation of the good increases
with abstinence). Also, sellers tend to set prices higher than those that maximize
current prots. The loss in current prots is compensated by higher future
prots associated to a customer base with higher willingness to pay.
These e¤ects are most relevant in those markets where the timing of pro-
duction (new product introductions) is crucial. We have shown that if the e¤ect
of transitory saturation is strong enough then monopoly power may have coun-
terintuitive consequences: overproduction may coexist with underconsumption.
In other words, rms may introduce new products too often but when they do
they sell them to too few consumers. This is true if we compare market equilib-
rium with the rst best (where the social planner controls both the frequency of
production and prices) and also with the second best (where the social planner
only controls the frequency of production.
Finally, competition tends to increase the frequency of production and hence
to make overproduction more likely. In fact, information sharing among inde-
pendent suppliers and coordination of production plans need not reduce social
welfare.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We apply Bellmans principle: choose rt in order to maximize:
W (t) =
t
2
 
1  r2t
  F + W (t+1)
24
The rst order condition of an interior solution (second order condition
holds) is:
rt = zW
0 (t+1) (18)
By the envelop theorem:
W 0 (t) =
1
2
 
1  r2t
  zW 0 (t+1) (1  rt)
Combining the two previous equations we can write:
W 0 (t) =
1
2
(1  rt)2
Hence, the optimal policy must satisfy:
rt 1 =
z
2
(1  rt)2 (19)
The stationary solution of this di¤erence equation is:
r =
1 + z  p1 + 2z
z
All the trajectories except r0 = r are explosive, and hence the unique
solution to the optimization problem is rt = r:
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Since 0 = 1 then it is obvious that 0 = 1: Let us now consider an arbitrary
value of N; 1 > N > 1: Since, N+1 = 1 this implies (equation (18))that
rN 1 = 0 and rt is obtained recursively from equation (19) for 0  t  N   2.
Also, note that since 0 = 1;then 0 < t < 1 for 0 < t  N   1:
First of all, we show that for any N; 1 > N > 1, dWN (0)d0 2
 
0; 12

: In
period t; 0  t  N   2; we have:
W (t) = tR (rt)  F + W (t+1)
where t+1 = 1  (1  ) (1  rt)t: Hence,
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dW (t)
dt
= R (rt)  z (1  rt) dW (t+1)
dt+1
Let us consider the case t = N   1. In this case dW (N )dN = 0; since there is
no production in period N: Moreover, rN 1 = 0. As a result,
dW (N 1)
dN 1
= 12 :
For an arbitrary t; 0  t  N   2, if dW (t+1)dt+1  0;
dW (t)
dt
< R (rt)  12 : Finally,
if dW (t+1)dt+1  12 ;
dW (t)
dt
> 0.
Suppose that in period 0 it is optimal to follow option N; 1 > N > 1: This
implies that in period N   1 option 1 is preferred to option N: That is,
W 1 (N 1) WN (N 1)
where N 1 < 1: Then since 12 =
dW 1(N 1)
dN 1
> dW
N (N 1)
dN 1
; it must be the
case that:
W 1 (1) WN (1)
And we reach a contradiction. Therefore, at 0 = 1; the only optimal options
are N = 1; and N =1:
8.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 2. Applying Bellmans principle:
(t) = argmax
pt
ft (1  rt) pt   F + (t+1)g
where t+1 = 1   (1  ) (1  rt)t, and rt is a linear function of pt with
slope equal to 1:
From the rst order condition of this optimization problem, we obtain:
pt = 1  rt + z0 (t+1)
Using the envelop theorem:
0 (t) = (1  rt) [pt   z0 (t+1)] = (1  rt)2 > 0
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Fix N; 1 < N < 1: In period t = N   1, which is the period that preceeds
the no production period, rN 1 = pN 1 and 0 (N ) = 0: As a result, pN 1 =
rN 1 = 12 ; and 
0 (N 1) = 14 :
For an arbitrary t; 0  t  N 2; rt > pt = 1 rt+z0 (t+1), which implies
that rt > 12 : Hence, 
0 (t) < 14 :
Suppose that in period 0 the rm nds it optimal to follow option N; 1 >
N > 1: This implies that in period N   1 option 1 is preferred to option N:
That is,
1 (N 1)  N (N 1)
where N 1 < 1: Then since 14 =
d1(N 1)
dN 1
> d
N (N 1)
dN 1
; it must be the
case that:
1 (1)  N (1)
And we reach a contradiction. Therefore, at 0 = 1; the only optimal options
for the rm are N = 1; and N =1:
27
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1
! 
p
! 
1
! 
1
! 
1
2
! 
1
2
! 
0
! 
r 
eq!(8 )!,!z = 1eq!(8)!,!z = 0
eq!(10)!,!z = 0
eq!(10)!,!z = 1
 
